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Every governed call — every tool call and every resource read, after authentication, scope and folder-ACL checks — draws one token from a bucket keyed by (caller_hash, scope_class, vault_id). The tiers (throttle.tiers) say how big a bucket is and how fast it refills; the backend says where the buckets live. That decides whether two server processes, or two restarts, share one limit. Zero configuration is unchanged: memory is the default, loads nothing extra and does no I/O.

Why you might want a shared backend

memory limits each process on its own. Stdio MCP clients each spawn their own server process, so N clients sharing one cacheDir get N times the configured limit, and a restart hands every caller a full bucket again. sqlite closes both gaps on one host; redis closes them across hosts.

memory

The behavior the server has always had. Idle buckets are reclaimed once they are guaranteed full, so eviction can never grant extra burst.

sqlite

Each governed call runs one BEGIN IMMEDIATE transaction that reads the bucket, refills it, takes the token and writes it back, so two processes can never spend the same token. A contended update waits at most db.busyTimeoutMs (default 5000) before it fails, and the failure policy below decides the call. The buckets get their own file, ratelimit.db, not cache.db. A bucket update is a write transaction per call, and the buckets are ephemeral, so sharing cache.db would queue every tool call behind the indexer’s long write transactions. Measured with a second process holding 20 ms write transactions on the same file, the mean cost of one bucket update rose from 97 µs (dedicated file) to 836 µs, with a 235 ms worst-case tail; the dedicated file only ever contends with its own tiny transactions. The file works under both Bun (bun:sqlite) and Node (better-sqlite3, or node:sqlite when that is unavailable), the same split as cache.db, and Bun and Node processes can share one file. ratelimit.db is disposable. Deleting it while no server is running only hands every caller a full bucket.

redis

The bucket update is one Lua script, so refill-and-take is atomic on the Redis server however many instances race. The script is sent with EVALSHA and re-sent automatically if the server’s script cache was flushed. Each bucket carries a TTL, so idle buckets vanish on their own. keyPrefix lets several deployments share one Redis.
  • The URL carries the password, so config never holds it. There is no inline url field. redis.urlEnv names the environment variable to read, and redis.urlFile (wins over urlEnv) points at a file whose content is the URL, for container secret mounts. The URL is never logged and is stripped from any connection error before it is printed.
  • Where the client must be resolvable. @redis/client is an optional dependency kept out of the bundle, so each way of running the server treats backend: "redis" differently:
  • Boot refusal. A missing URL, or a missing @redis/client, stops the server at startup with the exact remedy. An unreachable Redis at startup does not: that is an outage, handled by the failure policy.
  • Clocks. Instances compare their own wall clocks against the timestamp stored in the bucket. A clock that runs behind never mints tokens (a clock that stands still or runs backwards refills nothing), but an instance whose clock runs ahead refills faster. Keep instances on NTP.
  • The client speaks plain sockets, so it works under Node and Bun.

Failure policy

throttle.failurePolicy decides what a governed call does while sqlite or redis cannot be reached (Redis down, or SQLite locked beyond db.busyTimeoutMs). memory cannot fail. Why fail-open is the default. The limiter sits after authentication, scope and folder-ACL checks and, for destructive or HITL-floored calls, after the confirmation gate. No unauthenticated request reaches a bucket, so it is not a brute-force or access-control boundary: it bounds the rate of calls that are already authorized. Failing closed would let the death of a cache turn into an outage of every tool for every client. fail-open does not lift the limit: each process falls back to its own local buckets, so the worst case during an outage is N processes times the configured limit, the same as memory today. A refusal caused by the outage is not a rate-limit hit: it is not counted in reliquary_tc_rate_limit_hits_total. Reporting. The first failure of an outage logs one line to stderr and increments reliquary_tc_rate_limit_backend_outages_total{backend} once; recovery logs one line. It is never one line per request. While the backend is down it is probed at most once every 5 seconds, so an outage costs one failed call per window instead of one per request.

Overhead

One bucket update per governed call, measured with packages/server/scripts/bench-ratelimit.ts (20 000 sequential calls over 1 000 keys, Redis on localhost, on a shared 4-core arm64 box under load, so read the medians rather than the tails): A Redis on another host adds its network round trip to every governed call. The per-command deadline is 500 ms, and a slow Redis counts as an outage.